Capital formation in Latin America: one and a half century of macroeconomic dynamics by Tafunell, Xavier
c e p a l  r e v i e w  1 0 9  •  a p r i l  2 0 1 3 7
Capital formation in Latin America: one and a 
half century of macroeconomic dynamics
Xavier Tafunell
AbstrAct Macroeconomic studies indicate that physical capital formation has played a pivotal 
role in long-term economic growth. These studies have been hampered, however, 
by a data constraint: in order to pinpoint exactly what the role of capital formation 
has been, a larger empirical database –larger in terms of both the time span and 
the geographical area covered– is needed. This study addresses that problem by 
providing new and very extensive series on capital formation in Latin America. It 
also describes the different series used to identify long, medium and short-term 
movements. One of the outstanding features of these investment trends were their 
marked instability up to 1950. Another salient aspect has been the more robust 
growth in investment seen in the second half of the nineteenth century, which actually 
outdistanced the growth spurt that occurred during the “golden age” of 1950-1980. 
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Economic historians and specialists in the macroeconomics 
of development are continually trying to identify the 
explanatory forces behind long-term growth. Ever 
since the time of the classical economists, the idea that 
physical capital formation is one of the determinants 
of growth has been in the air. Economists who have 
sought to analyse this question empirically have used 
one of two approaches: growth regressions or growth 
accounting. The vast number of studies that have taken 
the first of these approaches have looked at a wide range 
of variables, but one of the few variables that is almost 
never omitted is investment, either as a flow or a stock 
(Levine and Renelt, 1992). In a study that employed 
various permutations to combine the variables used in 
all the different models (Sala-i-Martín, 1997), the author 
concludes that investment in equipment is the variable 
that is the most closely correlated with gross domestic 
product (gdp). More recently, Qi (2007) –as had Temple 
and Voth (1998) before her– has found that the link between 
growth and long-term capital formation is stronger in 
developing economies. In fact, no macroeconomist who 
has studied this subject has questioned the existence of 
a close, statistically robust relationship between capital 
formation and gdp. The issue on which they are not in 
agreement is the underlying causality; in other words, 
the role that physical capital formation plays in driving 
growth (Bosworth and Collins, 2003). This debate 
cannot, in all likelihood, be resolved until a broader 
spatio-temporal database can be constructed – one that 
incorporates very long-term series on investment in 
developing countries such as the Latin American nations. 
A review of the studies done using a growth 
accounting approach leads to the same conclusion even 
more clearly. Studies on industrialized economies show 
that total factor productivity has been the main driver 
of growth throughout the twentieth century (Kendrik, 
1993). Nonetheless, in all regions of the world other than 
the geographical area covered by the Organisation for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (oecd), physical 
capital formation has played a central role in driving 
growth, even during the second half of the twentieth 
century (Bosworth and Collins, 2003). The experiences 
of countries in Africa (Abu-Qarn and Abu-Bader, 2007) 
and Asia, both in relation to the “tigers” of South-East 
Asia and the two Asian giants (China and India),1 are 
informative. There are thus sound reasons for positing 
that physical capital formation has been one of the main 
sources of economic growth in Latin America during the 
past 150 years. The few growth-accounting studies on 
the subject for the second half of the twentieth century 
point in this direction. According to Elías (1992), physical 
capital formation was the most important determinant 
of growth in the region’s major economies between 
1940 and 1985. Hofman (2000), who used a much more 
sophisticated methodology, also found that capital was 
the most influential factor of production, although he 
calculated its contribution as being much smaller. In a 
study that, unlike any of its predecessors, took in all of 
the Latin American countries except Cuba for the period 
from 1960 to 2000, Loayza, Fajnzylber and Calderón 
(2005) found that capital and labour were more or less 
on a par in terms of their contribution to growth, whereas 
multifactor productivity did very little to spur growth. 
The aim of this study is to provide the academic 
community with an extensive body of fresh empirical 
evidence on Latin American countries’ investment flows 
so that scholars looking at long-term growth trends in 
these economies will have very long-term data series 
on this fundamental explanatory factor. As is well 
known, thanks to the series compiled and reworked by 
Maddison (2007), we still lack estimated gdp series for 
the vast majority of Latin American countries for the 
second half of the nineteenth century and even for the 
early twentieth century in some cases. As a result, the 
series on capital formation presented here do not shed 
1  Regarding the South-East Asian economies, see Krugman (1994), 
Kim and Landau (1994), Young (1994 and 1995), Collins and Bosworth 
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light on the links between capital formation and gdp, but 
rather on a much simpler and more basic question: the 
approximate trends in gdp in Latin American economies 
during the years when the capability of measuring them 
was not yet in place. 
This article is structured very simply. Section II 
describes the method used to estimate gross fixed capital 
formation (gfcf) for the “pre-statistics era” (the years 
before official national accounts were kept). Section 
III covers the long-term trends in gfcf for 1856-2008. 
Section IV outlines medium- and short-term movements 
and then offers a brief concluding review. The study 
closes with a table showing the series that have been 
compiled for use by researchers in this field.
II
gfcf estimates for the latin american  
countries, 1856-1950
gfcf estimates are usually calculated in the course of 
the preparation of national accounts, i.e., on the basis of 
gdp computations. The vast majority of Latin American 
countries began to keep official national accounts around 
1950, and they did so by following the conceptual and 
methodological guidelines set out by the United Nations. 
The support provided by the United Nations’ regional 
agency, the Economic Commission for Latin America 
and the Caribbean (eclac), proved to be a crucial factor 
in the success of this decentralized, collective effort. 
Thanks to the ongoing technical assistance and advisory 
services made available by eclac, together with its 
work in compiling and standardizing the data, the region 
now has a complete, comparable database on the main 
supply-side and demand-side components of gdp and on 
total gdp for all the countries of the region from 1950 
onward.2 A number of authors have used these statistics 
to analyse the way in which capital formation and capital 
stocks influenced the Latin American economies’ growth 
during the second half of the twentieth century. 
The picture is a very different one for the years 
before 1950. Apart from the individual historical series 
prepared for some economies of the region, the only 
fairly broad-coverage homogeneous reconstruction 
of gfcf series is the one developed by André Hofman 
2  Historical series on aggregates prepared using a standardized 
methodology (United Nations System of National Accounts 1993 
(SNA,1993)) are contained in the database that can be accessed online 
through eclac Cuadernos estadísticos No. 37 (http://www.eclac.cl/
deype/cuaderno37/esp/index.htm). The data for Cuba are limited, 
and the full annual series therefore usually cover 19 Latin American 
countries and 13 Caribbean ones. The statistics for the Caribbean 
nations generally date back only as far as 1970, however. There are 
some gaps in the series on both Latin American nations and Caribbean 
countries in the case of the less developed economies. For a discussion 
of the gaps in capital formation series, see Tafunell (2011).
(2000) for 1900 and 1994 for Argentina, Brazil, Chile, 
Colombia, Mexico and Venezuela. The only precedent 
for an effort of this type was the preliminary evaluations 
undertaken by, once again, eclac in 1951. No study of 
this sort had been done on the other 14 Latin American 
countries, however, and, as a result, trends in capital 
formation for the region as a whole prior to 1950 are 
simply unknown.
The main objective of this study is simply to 
determine the annual levels of fixed capital formation 
in all the countries of the region during a period of time 
preceding the introduction of official national accounts. 
How long should this period be? Ideally, the data should 
go back as far as the early nineteenth century, when these 
countries were in the process of becoming independent. 
The early statistical evidence is of such poor quality, 
however, that the starting point for the series has to be 
moved up to midway through that century: 1856, to 
be exact (Tafunell, 2011). The ongoing civil strife and 
outright chaos experienced by many of these countries 
up to around that time (or even later) attests to just how 
difficult it would be to quantify investment levels on 
any consistent basis during the decades following these 
countries’ political emancipation.3 After calculating 
the gfcf up to 1950, the series were merged with the 
official series compiled by eclac.4 This should by no 
means be interpreted as implying that the two series are 
of comparable quality. They have been merged simply in 
3  The overview provided by Dye (2006) is helpful in gaining an 
understanding of the difficulties involved in establish a stable institutional 
order. For an opposing interepretation that is highly critical of the 
conventional wisdom on this subject, see Deas (2010).
4  This study focuses solely on the series prepared by the author (i.e., 
the series for 1856-1950), since the series for years since 1950 are 
well-known and widely available (see footnote 2). 
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order to obtain a very long-term picture of gfcf trends. 
This is a legitimate exercise, in the author’s view, so long 
as the results of the quantification are sufficiently reliable. 
This statistical reconstruction provides a way of 
obtaining an overview of the investment activity of all 
the countries of Latin America, and it has proven to be 
an almost entirely successful approach. As shown in the 
tables presented here, measurements of gfcf have been 
obtained for 17 countries. The only ones that have been 
omitted are Guatemala, Panama and Paraguay.5 Since 
these three small countries account for no more than a 
tiny fraction of the region’s total gfcf, the series presented 
here for 17 Latin American countries can be viewed 
as being representative of Latin America as a whole.6 
gfcf is an economic aggregate that encompasses 
capital goods of various sorts which are acquired because 
they serve as inputs for production process, because of 
the length of their useful life and, above all, because they 
help to boost productivity in the economy as a whole 
thanks to their embedded technologies. In calculating 
the amount of capital stock that they represent, they are 
usually divided into four categories: machinery and related 
equipment, transport equipment, residential construction 
and non-residential construction. Hofman (2000) used 
this classification for his study on this subject in six of 
the larger Latin American economies. Unfortunately, it 
has not been possible –and may never be possible– to 
apply his methodology to the other economies of the 
region, especially for the years preceding the twentieth 
century. The quantifications that I have prepared have 
yielded investment series for three categories of goods: 
machinery and related equipment; transport equipment; 
and construction. Any attempt to break down this last 
category into residential and non-residential construction 
is doomed to failure because the types of indicators or 
information that would be needed in order to differentiate 
between the two are simply not available.7 Moreover, 
5  Panama is not covered because the foreign trade statistics compiled 
by the more industrialized countries, which were the main source for 
the estimates up to 1929, attribute merchandise trade flows to that 
country that were actually directed towards other countries owing to 
Panama’s unique position, thanks to the Panama Canal, as a transit 
country. The series for Guatemala and Paraguay could not be calculated 
for 1930-1950 because the data were exceedingly difficult to obtain 
and/or process.
6  My calculations (based on official statistics published by eclac) 
indicate that the aggregate level of investment for these three countries in 
1950 amounted to just 1.3% of the total for Latin America (20 countries). 
7  An arbitrary estimate of investment in residential construction 
might be derived from the growth patterns of the urban population. 
This would be a very tenuous approximation, however, since many 
countries did not carry out population censuses for many years, and 
very little is known about their urban population trends.
the built-in limitations of the official national accounts 
database maintained by eclac are such that the 
disaggregation of gfcf can be carried only so far. The 
annual series available in the eclac database include 
just two aggregates: machinery and other equipment, and 
construction. As a result, the definitive series presented 
in this article (see the table in the annex) refer only to 
these two fundamental categories of capital formation. 
How have I gone about calculating the levels of these 
two types of investment? A detailed description of the 
sources and methods used is provided in Tafunell (2011). 
A much briefer outline will be provided here owing to 
space constraints. Official foreign trade statistics are the 
main –virtually only– source used for this quantification 
exercise, since the economies of the region presumably 
purchased their stock of capital goods from more 
industrialized economies. For the years from 1856 to 
1929, trade statistics for Germany, the United States and 
the United Kingdom have been used; for the period from 
1929 to 1950, the calculations are based on official trade 
statistics for the Latin American countries themselves. 
The procedure used to arrive at these estimates is based 
on the compilation of annual series, using indices for 
investment in equipment and in construction between 1856 
and 1950. The series have been converted into dollars at 
1950 prices using the level of investment for that year, in 
current dollars, as a unit of account (numéraire), as shown 
in the eclac database. The investment indices that I have 
ended up with are the result of the chain-linking of separate 
indices for 1856-1890, 1890-1929 and 1929-1950. The 
investment series for construction are composed of quantum 
indices based on imports or the apparent consumption of 
basic inputs (iron and steel for construction plus –from 
1900 on– cement). I also ran a sensitivity test for 1925-
1950, comparing the volume (tons) series and the value 
(constant prices) series for metal inputs in order to verify 
that using one or the other does not affect the outcome in 
statistical terms. The series for investment in machinery 
and other equipment is based on the value of imported 
goods at 1913 prices for 1856-1929 and at 1950 prices 
for 1929-1950.8 For Argentina, Brazil and Mexico, I took 
domestically produced equipment into account and, for 
those countries plus Chile, Colombia and Cuba, I took 
8  For the years from 1856 to 1929, I first computed aggregate investment 
figures in pounds sterling, German marks and United States dollars 
at current prices and then converted them into a common currency 
(pounds). I then deflated the resulting aggregate series using a price 
index for which the base year of 1913 equals 100. For 1929-1950, 
I also computed series at current and constant prices, with the latter 
being derived through the application of implicit unit values for 1950 
to the quantity data.
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domestically produced iron for use in construction into 
account as well, since, unlike the situation in the other 
countries of Latin America, national producers were 
meeting an appreciable share of demand from the 1930s 
on.9 One point that remains open for discussion, which 
could lead to a revision of the calculations, is whether or 
not investment in equipment in Chile, Cuba and Uruguay, 
and perhaps in some other countries such as Colombia 
and Peru, should also include domestic output, since it 
is quite likely that national producers had ceased to be of 
negligible importance by 1929 or even a few years before 
then.10 The estimates for these countries may also have 
a slight downward bias because they do not incorporate 
the output of the railroad companies’ machine shops.11
9  For a more detailed discussion, see Tafunell (2011).
10  In his recently submitted doctoral thesis, Ducoing (2012, pp. 
69-70) states that, before the Great Depression, Chilean producers 
accounted for no more than 3% of that country’s total available supply 
of equipment even in their best years. During the Second World War, 
when it became more and more difficult to import equipment, national 
producers’ share of the market climbed to 16%, but shrank again to 
less than 7% during the first decade of the post-war period.
11  The studies conducted by Guajardo (1996 and 1998) provide an 
informative view of the role of railroad machine shops in Chile and 
The main methodological caveat in terms of 
the estimates given here has to do with a different 
aspect, however: investment in construction. Since 
my measurements are based solely on the apparent 
consumption of “modern” inputs, such as iron, steel and 
cement, they are clearly not very representative of activity 
in housing construction until well into the twentieth 
century and are actually not sufficiently representative 
of non-residential construction in the second half of the 
nineteenth century either. Given the widespread use of 
traditional materials during those years (stone, wood and 
clay), my figures on investment in construction surely, 
at the very least, overstate its long-term growth.12 
Mexico. They indicate that, even in those countries, where it is thought 
that they became a force to be reckoned with, they actually accounted 
for no more than a small share of production.
12  This points up what is quite likely an insurmoutable constraint, 
since statistics on the production of traditional construction materials 
are simply not available for this time period. It must be remembered 
that the large-scale use of iron and steel in infrastructure works came 
hand-in-hand with the laying of the railroads. For a discussion of the 
spread of the use of cement, see Tafunell (2007).
III
the long-term growth of gfcf
The first aspect of the results of this quantification exercise 
that is of interest is the long-term growth rate of aggregate 
investment and the way in which it has varied. gfcf in 
Latin America, according to my calculations, soared by 
a factor of 95 between 1856 and 1950, which equates to 
a cumulative annual growth rate of 5.0%. Interestingly 
enough, this growth rate exceeds, although not by a large 
margin, the rate registered for the years following 1950, 
since between 1950 and 2008 it rose at an annual rate of 
4.4%. The progress made in terms of capitalization during 
the first stage of the globalization process (up to 1913) 
outpaced the advances achieved during the “golden age” 
of State-led industrialization and during the second stage 
of the globalization process in recent decades (see tables 
1 and 2). This clearly has to do with the “Gerschenkron 
effect”, since the growth potential for investment in the 
nineteenth century was extraordinary given the extremely 
low levels it had reached around 1850. 
Focusing on the period of 1856-1950 (since much 
less is known about this period than the one that followed), 
tables 1 and 2 show the average annual growth rates for 
gfcf in absolute and per-capita terms for the periods 
associated with the different growth phases that can 
be identified according to the literature. These figures 
show that the years 1873 and 1890 marked the turning 
points at which sharp, sustained surges in investment 
triggered serious financial crises (Marichal, 1989). The 
years 1913 and 1929 are so well known to have been 
turning points in the business cycle that it is unnecessary 
to dwell on this point here. The graph of the aggregate 
investment series for Latin America (see figure 1) leaves 
little doubt as to the appropriateness of the time-based 
categories shown in the tables. Clearly, figure 1 depicts 
major short-term movements (movements encompassing 
a decade or less) which we will look at again later on 
(see the following section). 
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1856-1950 5.7 ... 3.8 4.0 6.2 ... 4.5a 5.6b ... 5.1a ... 6.9 ... 5.2 5.7a 4.2a 6.8 ... 2.6
1856-1913 8.3 ... 5.2 5.8 6.0 ... ... ... ... ... ... 7.6 ... 4.8 ... ... 5.1 7.0 4.1
1913-1950 1.8 0.5 1.8 1.3 6.4 2.5 1.3 4.7 4.1 2.7 4.8 5.8 3.0 5.8 3.3 0.9 9.4 ... 2.7
1856-1873 9.9 ... 4.5 7.6 12.9 ... ... ... ... ... ... 8.1 ... 12.9 ... ... 9.4 6.9 7.1
1873-1890 16.9 ... 4.6 9.8 -0.5 ... 6.0 6.1 ... 5.9 ... 18.7 ... -3.6 14.0 8.4 7.1 13.2 8.7
1890-1913 1.2 26.7 6.0 1.5 6.0 7.2 7.7 -0.4 2.1 8.0 15.5 -0.3 -0.9 5.5 3.2 5.8 0.7 2.7 4.1
1913-1929 1.7 2.7 1.0 4.7 11.9 6.2 0.4 8.5 6.8 1.1 2.7 5.8 6.6 7.6 1.9 6.0 14.7 5.5 7.3
1929-1950 1.8 -1.2 2.4 -1.2 2.4 -0.3 2.0 2.0 2.0 4.0 6.4 5.8 0.3 4.4 4.4 -2.9 5.6 ... 3.2
1950-1980 4.7 4.9 7.4 3.3 5.3 8.3 ... 8.0 ... 5.9 8.2 8.3 6.5 5.9 8.5 2.4 5.1 ... 6.6
1980-2008 1.9 3.4 1.1 7.0 3.9 4.6 ... 1.4 ... 2.8 4.3 2.6 2.9 3.3 5.5 0.1 1.3 ... 2.2
Source: Prepared by the author on the basis of the annex table and http://www.cepal.org/deype/cuaderno37/esp/index.htm.
a 1870-1950. 
b 1865-1950.
gfcf: Gross fixed capital formation. 
TABLE 2



































































































1856-1950 2.8 ... 1.7 2.5 4.4 ... 2.6a 4.0b ... 3.8a ... 5.5 ... 3.8 2.7a 1.8a 5.4 ... 3.2
1856-1913 4.9 ... 3.2 4.3 4.6 ... ... ... ... ... ... 6.5 ... 3.5 ... ... 3.8 5.6 4.8
1913-1950 -0.4 -0.6 -0.4 -0.3 4.2 0.2 -1.0 2.8 2.2 1.4 2.6 4.0 1.2 4.2 0.2 -0.8 7.8 ... 0.7
1856-1873 7.1 ... 2.9 6.0 11.5 ... ... ... ... ... ... 7.1 ... 11.6 ... ... 8.1 5.6 5.9
1873-1890 13.3 ... 2.7 8.3 -1.7 ... 5.0 5.0 ... 4.9 ... 17.3 ... -4.3 11.2 4.7 5.5 11.6 9.1
1890-1913 -2.3 25.9 3.7 0.3 4.3 4.9 5.8 -1.7 1.0 6.7 12.4 -1.3 -2.7 3.8 0.4 3.3 -0.4 1.4 0.9
1913-1929 -0.9 1.2 -1.1 3.3 9.1 4.4 -2.2 7.6 4.6 -0.4 0.5 5.0 5.6 6.1 -1.1 3.7 13.8 3.9 1.6
1929-1950 -0.1 -1.9 0.0 -2.9 0.5 -3.0 -0.1 -0.7 0.5 2.7 4.3 3.2 -2.0 2.7 1.2 -4.1 3.5 ... 0.1
1950-1980 3.0 2.6 4.5 1.3 2.4 5.1 ... 5.0 ... 3.9 5.0 5.1 3.2 3.1 5.3 1.5 1.3 ... 3.6
1980-2008 0.6 1.1 -0.6 5.4 2.1 2.2 ... -0.6 ... 0.9 1.7 1.0 0.9 1.5 3.6 -0.4 -0.9 ... 0.4
Source: prepared by the author on the basis of the annex table and http://www.cepal.org/deype/cuaderno37/esp/index.htm ; and, for population: 
C. Yánez and others, “La población de los países latinoamericanos desde el siglo XIX hasta 2008. Ensayo de historia cuantitativa”, Documento 
de trabajo, No. 1202, Asociación Española de Historia Económica, 2012.
a 1870-1950. 
b 1865-1950.
gfcf: gross fixed capital formation.
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FIGURE 1





















































































Source: prepared by the authors on the basis of the annex table.
gfcf: gross fixed capital formation.
Focusing on the way in which the long-term 
capitalization process unfolded in Latin America as a 
whole, figure 1 and tables 1 and 2 shed light on two 
particularly interesting factors. One is that the peak 
in investment activity did not occur during the second 
half of the twentieth century, as is usually thought, 
but rather in the second half of the nineteenth century. 
This is especially evident when investment activity is 
measured in per-capita terms. The growth rate for gfcf 
from 1856 to 1890 was not equalled at any point in the 
twentieth century. The second outstanding feature of 
aggregate investment trends is the marked degree of 
volatility seen in the 100 years leading up to 1950. Figure 
1 shows quite clearly how investment growth cycles 
and phases have smoothed out since then. In fact, this 
change in trend is so marked that it may be regarded as 
signalling the emergence of a different and less unstable 
investment pattern.13 
13  The fact that this change in investment trends coincides with the 
point in time when these estimates begin to be based on official figures 
would seem to be grounds for a strong suspicion that this changover 
in data sources may be the reason why the series for the years before 
1950 reflect a much greater degree of volatility than the post-1950 
series do. I have been unable to find any corroborating evidence for 
that suspicion, however.
Turning back to the first point: the data indicate that 
the slowdown in investment actually began before the 
outbreak of the First World War. The period between 1890 
and 1913 was one of slow growth, as capital formation 
was depressed for the entire decade following the Baring 
crisis, which set foreign investors back for years. In the 
following period (1913-1929), a moderate upswing in 
growth was cut short by the Great Depression. The 
period 1929-1950 was the least robust stage in the 150 
years covered by this analysis, along with 1980-2008; 
in fact, it was so sluggish that, in per capita terms, total 
output was completely flat (see table 2). This evidence 
strongly refutes the traditional historical narrative, in 
which investment was said to have jumped with the 
advent of the import-substitution industrialization model 
which followed the disruption caused by the Great 
Depression.14 It would seem that the financial squeeze 
14  The traditional view is taken up, from a critical perspective, in the 
essays of Luis Bértola and Jeffrey Williamson, Stephen Haber and Richard 
Salvucci that have been published in Bulmer-Thomas, Coatsworth and 
Cortés Conde (2006). The analysis authored by José A. Ocampo (2004) 
could be said to set out –for now– the canonical position on this issue, 
according to which the industrialization process gathered a huge amount 
of momentum in the 1930s and during the Second World War while 
not radically changing the development pattern of Latin America that 
had been in place up to the crisis of 1929. 
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occasioned by the interruption of external capital inflows 
and the decline in the purchasing power of exports played 
a more important part than government action did in 
galvanizing investment. 
Another noteworthy and rather surprising feature of 
tables 1 and 2 are the differences between countries over a 
century of gfcf growth. The rates of capital accumulation 
do not correlate to relative levels of per capita income in 
1950, according to data published by Maddison (2007). 
Mexico, the Dominican Republic (only in absolute terms) 
and Colombia exhibit the highest rates of capitalization 
between 1856 and 1950, yet their per capita gdp was below 
the average for Latin America in 1950. Also surprising 
is the fact that Ecuador and Haiti —two very laggard 
economies— built up capital at the same rate as the region 
overall.15 Something similar may be supposed to have 
happened in Central America: although the evolution 
of investment has not been estimated for 1929-1950, in 
1856-1929 it gained more ground than in Latin America 
overall. Conversely, some of the region’s more developed 
economies, such as Chile, capitalized at below-average 
rates. The trajectories for other countries coincide with what 
might be expected in relation to their degree of economic 
development. It comes as no surprise, then, that investment 
in Argentina progressed further and investment in Brazil 
less than the regional average. Incidentally, investment 
patterns over the century provide the best illustration of 
the way the major investment opportunities offered by 
the first wave of globalization contrasted with the limited 
possibilities available once the international economy 
began to disintegrate.
What explanation can there be for the fact that 
national gfcf growth rates in 1856-1950 are so unrelated, 
in many cases, to relative per capita gdp around 1950? 
The unexpected figures in tables 1 and 2 seem to cast an 
ominous doubt on the consistency of the quantification, 
regardless that previous findings (Tafunell, 2007, 2009a 
and 2009b) confirm its reliability. The key to the paradox 
lies, basically, in the starting levels of investment. These 
were very uneven in the mid-nineteenth century, as we 
will see below. But first, a look is warranted at how 
the two basic categories of investment (equipment and 
construction) evolved. These series are represented 
in figure 2. Tables 3 and 4 contain the figures for the 
average annual rates of variation for both categories in 
the periods under review. 
15  In these two cases, the growth rates do not refer to the total period 
because information is lacking for the first few years. But it is unlikely 
that the results would vary significantly if we had those data.
In figure 2 it leaps to the eye that capital formation 
in machinery and related equipment climbed more 
vigorously than investment in construction (and more, 
obviously, than overall investment). This makes sense, 
since long-term economic growth depends more on 
the endowment and quality of machinery than on the 
acquisition and renewal of other capital goods. In 
Latin America, during the century prior to 1950, the 
difference between the two annual growth rates was quite 
considerable: 6.3%, compared with 4.6.16 Interestingly, 
the difference between the two rates was greatest in the 
period 1856-1913 (8.5% and 5.9%, respectively), then 
it narrowed sharply in 1913-1950 (3.1% and 2.6 %, 
respectively). What is more, between 1929 and 1950, the 
relative positions shifted: capital formation in equipment 
rose very little, whereas investment in construction rose 
in keeping with its moderate growth since 1890. Figure 
2 shows very clearly that capital formation grew faster in 
equipment than in construction until 1890. Since then, 
the two series have followed a very similar long-term 
trajectory. All this backs up the idea mentioned earlier 
that the capitalization process in the second half of the 
nineteenth century was materially different to the process 
in the first half of the twentieth century. 
This is, undoubtedly, the most important lesson 
to be drawn from the comparison between tables 3 and 
4. The varied investment profiles of the growth phases 
between 1856 and 1950 are also interesting to examine. 
In the upsurge of 1856 to 1873, equipment stock was 
accumulated at an extraordinarily high —and never 
repeated— annual rate of 12.2%, almost double the rate 
for investment in construction. In the following phase 
(1873-1890) the frenetic pace of railway laying drove 
growth in construction investment ahead of still-dynamic 
investment in machinery. The financial crisis of 1890 
dealt a harsh blow to the transport sector, with lasting 
effects, while the equipment endowment rose from 
then until 1929 at a respectable annual rate of almost 
6%. From a general perspective, the data in table 4 are 
notably similar to those in table 1, owing to the heavy 
weight of construction investment in gfcf.17
16  For example, in Spain the rates of increase over this century-long 
period were, respectively, 3.3% and 2.5%, with an aggregate investment 
growth rate of 2.6% per year, according to series prepared by Prados 
de la Escosura (2003).
17  It will be recalled that the index numbers series for the two categories 
of gfcf have been transformed by applying the magnitude of gfcf 
in 1950, at that year’s prices. At that date, investment in construction 
represented 63.8% of overall investment in Latin America (17 countries). 
It is worth adding that the differences between countries in this respect 
are not very significant, with a standard deviation of 8.8. 
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FIGURE 2








































































































Source: prepared by the author on the basis of the annex table.
gfcf: gross fixed capital formation.
TABLE 3









































































































1856-1950 8.4 ... 5.8 5.3 5.4 ... 4.5a 7.3b ... 5.0a ... 7.8 ... 6.6 4.7a 4.6a 7.7 ... 6.3
1856-1913 11.7 ... 8.9 7.9 5.9 ... ... ... ... ... ... 9.1 ... 6.7 ... ... 6.0 7.7 8.5
1913-1950 3.4 -0.5 1.1 1.4 4.6 1.7 2.8 4.6 4.2 4.9 7.2 5.8 1.8 6.5 1.4 1.6 10.3 ... 3.1
1856-1873 13.2 ... 12.0 11.0 13.4 ... ... ... ... ... ... 14.1 ... 19.0 ... ... 3.5 4.1 12.2
1873-1890 19.5 ... 7.8 9.5 -1.1 ... 6.2 22.3 ... 9.1 ... 11.1 ... -5.0 20.4 9.5 10.1 15.9 8.5
1890-1913 5.2 33.4 7.5 4.6 6.0 5.2 4.5 7.9 5.6 3.2 8.3 4.0 1.9 7.3 6.0 3.1 4.8 4.6 5.8
1913-1929 6.1 3.8 1.8 6.4 12.6 6.1 0.9 6.1 4.7 7.5 5.8 6.4 5.4 4.8 0.9 5.6 12.8 5.8 5.1
1929-1950 1.5 -3.6 0.6 -2.2 -1.1 -1.5 4.3 3.4 3.8 3.0 8.3 5.3 -0.9 7.7 7.8 -1.3 8.4 ... 1.7
Source: prepared by the author on the basis of the annex table.
a  1870-1950. 
b 1865-1950.
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We now return to the questions that remained 
unanswered from the reading of tables 1 and 2. A working 
hypothesis may be formed on the basis of table 5. The 
first few rows of data speak of very uneven levels of 
investment per capita within the region around 1856. 
These levels were uneven later, too, in fact throughout 
the period under study. And it may be tempting to say that 
there have always been huge inequalities in this respect— 
as there are, indeed, in other economic aggregates. In 
colonial times, especially latterly, levels of production 
activity, and in all probability investment, are known to 
have differed greatly in the various territories, although 
these disparities were not necessarily exactly as shown 
in the first few rows of table 5. All the evidence available 
points to early development —around the middle third 
of the nineteenth century— in a few economies such as 
Cuba, Argentina, Chile and Uruguay (probably in that 
order), and to lag and stalled or very weak growth in that 
period in other economies such as Colombia, Ecuador, 
Bolivia, Mexico, Peru, Venezuela and the small Central 
American states, except for Costa Rica.18 
What is really startling in table 5 are the gaping 
differences in the endowment of new capital per capita 
by the middle decades of the nineteenth century. Whereas 
18  Bértola and Ocampo (2010, p. 19) note that economic inequalities 
were very great in the period 1820-1870. They find that Argentina and 
Uruguay were the earliest developers, followed by Chile and Cuba.
Argentina and Chile were investing around US$ 9 (at 
1950 prices) annually per capita, Mexico, the Central 
American nations, Peru and Colombia were investing 
US¢ 16, US¢ 45, US¢ 74 and US¢ 89, respectively. 
We now turn to the data for the 1870s, when economic 
globalization was beginning to inject vigour into the 
Latin American economies, and for which my data 
processing spans a larger and more representative group 
of nations. Taking the leading economy, Argentina, as 
a reference, we see that the investment effort in the 
next most prosperous economies (Chile and Uruguay) 
was around 50% and 75% of Argentina’s, as shown in 
table 5,19 and 25% of that figure for Latin America as 
19  Cuba should also figure in this group, but the Ten Years’ War (1868-
1878) depressed investment in the country. With regard to Uruguay, the 
data in the table and the annex require some clarification. My estimate 
for investment in construction yields figures too high to be credible 
until, at least, the final years of the nineteenth century. Fortunately, 
there is another measurement with which to compare and substitute 
mine: one prepared by Bértola (1998). This author calculated the 
gross value added of the construction industry on the basis of data on 
building permits and public works spending. Comparison of his series 
and mine shows that the two have a broadly similar profile in terms of 
cyclical movements, but diverge significantly as to level before 1900. 
For want of a better explanation, I assume that my figures grossly 
overstate the level of investment in Uruguay because much of the 
material imported through the port of Montevideo was in fact destined 
for the Argentine market. This is mere conjecture, however, and needs 
to be verified. Meanwhile, I have adopted the series constructed by 
Bértola and linked it with mine in 1870 and 1936. 
TABLE 4












































































































1856-1950 5.3 ... 3.4 3.5 6.8 ... 4.5a 5.1b ... 5.2a ... 6.4 ... 4.7 6.4a 5.7 6.5 ... 4.6
1856-1913 8.0 ... 4.1 4.9 6.1 ... ... ... ... ... ... 6.8 ... 4.3 ... 9.1 4.9 7.0 5.9
1913-1950 1.3 1.2 2.3 1.2 7.9 3.3 0.0 4.9 4.0 2.3 4.2 5.8 5.5 5.4 4.6 0.6 9.0 ... 2.6
1856-1873 9.8 ... 3.5 6.9 12.1 ... ... ... ... ... ... 4.5 ... 11.5 ... 13.2 10.2 7.7 6.4
1873-1890 16.8 ... 3.4 9.9 0.6 ... 5.6 5.6 ... 5.0 ... 23.2 ... -3.1 12.5 7.8 6.8 12.5 11.3
1890-1913 0.8 23.6 5.0 0.0 6.0 12.9 11.3 -3.0 0.8 9.2 18.8 -2.2 -5.5 4.8 1.2 7.1 -0.2 2.5 1.8
1913-1929 5.1 34.3 0.8 2.2 7.5 11.3 16.8 0.6 -1.5 4.1 29.0 -2.9 -3.1 -2.6 1.4 6.1 -0.6 3.1 2.5
1929-1950 1.9 1.3 3.9 0.0 5.7 0.9 -0.1 0.9 1.1 4.3 5.9 6.3 2.0 2.9 6.0 -3.5 4.4 ... 2.6
Source: prepared by the author on the basis of the annex table.
a  1870-1950. 
b 1865-1950.
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a group. The most laggard economies show investment 
efforts of less than 10% of the figure for Argentina: 8.1% 
for the Dominican Republic; 6% for the small Central 
American states; 2.9% for Mexico; 2.6% for Ecuador; 
and 1.8% for Haiti. Ahead of this group of severely 
undercapitalized economies was another group, with 
investment levels that were still very low, comprising 
Colombia (15.1% of Argentina’s level), Peru (12.7%) 
and Venezuela (11.5%). 
What emerges from table 5, then, is that the 
economies that were the region’s richest at the end of 
the first globalization period (Argentina, Uruguay, Chile 
and Cuba) made headway in capital formation very early 
on. In the middle decades of the nineteenth century, if 
not before, these countries enjoyed an investment boom 
as a result of which their per capita investment levels 
were, fluctuations notwithstanding, several times those 
of poor economies by the starting point of the series 
(1856-1859). It follows, then, that great divergence 
must have occurred within the region in the first half 
of the nineteenth century. This being so, the more 
laggard economies, whose levels of capitalization per 
capita were tiny around 1850, would naturally tend to 
capitalize faster than the advanced economies whenever 
the opportunity arose, as is apparent in table 2. This, 
of course, produced a certain amount of convergence 
within the region, at least in terms of capital formation. 
In an earlier work (Tafunell, 2009a), I postulated this 
hypothesis for the period 1914-1930.20 Now, the data 
processing over a much longer period seems to bear out 
that hypothesis for the century and a half since 1856. 
A more careful analysis of the series, beyond this rapid 
presentation of the qualitative reconstruction performed, 
would test this hypothesis and its validity for different 
historical subperiods. 
20  Bértola and Ocampo (2010, pp. 19-20 and 26) argue that there was 
a process of economic convergence in the region from 1910 to 1990.
TABLE 5










































































































1856-1859 9.3 ... 6.1 9.3 0.9 ... ... ... ... ... ... 0.2 ... 0.7 ... ... 2.0 0.5 3.0
1860-1869 22.1 ... 6.3 13.6 3.4 ... ... 0.3 ... ... ... 0.6 ... 1.2 ... ... 3.1 0.6 4.9
1870-1879 35.5 ... 11.8 17.7 5.3 ... 7.6 0.9 ... 0.7 ... 1.0 ... 4.4 3.6 27.0 4.1 2.1 8.8
1880-1889 120.0 ... 13.6 24.2 8.2 ... 8.8 2.6 ... 0.8 ... 3.4 ... 1.1 9.0 56.8 14.4 5.3 18.1
1890-1899 82.0 0.1 16.9 34.6 5.8 20.8 19.8 3.1 5.7 2.6 0.7 6.4 4.3 1.6 10.8 35.0 10.2 9.4 17.9
1900-1909 94.6 0.9 13.9 43.1 4.6 28.4 33.1 3.2 2.2 1.3 1.2 8.8 2.5 2.8 4.0 55.4 4.5 6.2 19.7
1910-1919 90.7 1.3 18.7 50.6 9.5 25.7 56.5 3.4 4.8 3.8 5.6 6.3 4.0 3.2 13.1 91.9 10.9 8.4 24.4
1920-1929 92.6 2.5 21.9 64.5 36.9 42.6 55.2 8.7 12.2 4.0 9.9 11.7 7.4 7.4 19.4 204.4 70.2 17.3 33.9
1930-1939 96.3 2.2 17.1 49.6 27.8 53.7 14.1 6.4 7.0 2.7 8.4 12.1 4.7 6.7 7.1 167.8 100.8 ... 31.4
1940-1950 106.4 3.0 25.4 60.3 45.5 57.3 25.4 8.4 10.4 4.7 12.8 24.2 7.5 15.3 12.5 91.8 233.2 ... 42.8
Source: X. Tafunell, “Un siglo de formación de capital en América Latina (1856-1950). Ensayo de cuantificación general”, paper presented at 
the X International Congress of the Spanish Association of Economic History (Carmona, Spain, 7-9 September), 2011.
a The figure shown for 1860-1869 is the average for 1865-1869. 
gfcf: gross fixed capital formation.
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Figure 1 shows a markedly cyclical dynamic. Short-
term movements (of no more than a decade) prevail 
over long-term growth trends of the aggregate. The 
cyclical fluctuations over the course of several historical 
intervals are large enough and sharp enough to eclipse 
underlying trends. 
The cyclical peaks depicted in figure 1 are compiled 
in table 6, which shows the cumulative average annual 
growth rate recorded in each of these cycles —from high 
to high— and a simple measure of investment volatility, 
the standard deviation of the year-on-year variation rates.
TABLE 6
gfcf cycles in latin america
Period
Average annual  
rate of growth
(percentages)




























Source: prepared by the author on the basis of the annex table and 
http://www.cepal.org/deype/cuaderno37/esp/index.htm.
gfcf: gross fixed capital formation.
Leaving aside the well-known events since the 
Second World War, a first point which merits attention 
is that there were only three episodes of slippage: 1890-
1896, 1913-1920 and 1929-1937. 
In the first of these cycles the fall was very sharp: 
almost half (43.7%) measured from high to high. The 
data show, then, that the Baring crisis had a deeply 
depressive effect that set it apart from other crises, as 
several authors have argued (Mitchener and Weidenmier, 
2008). The plunge caused by the First World War was not 
as deep, thanks to the powerful reactivation that ensued 
in 1919-1920. In the last of the three cycles (1929-1937) 
the contraction endured during the fateful years of the 
Great Depression weighed more heavily than the upturn 
generated by the kick-start of industrialization by import 
substitution. A final interesting point in this connection 
is that capitalization slumped more heavily in the two 
great depressions mentioned than in the “lost decade” 
of the 1980s.
Turning to cycles dominated by the upswing, 
the first observations is that these predominate 
overwhelmingly: high positive average annual rates of 
variation characterized 9 of the 12 cyclical movements 
identified. The cycles with the largest overall increases 
measured from peak to peak were 1884-1890, 1860-1865 
and 1920-1929. The first stands out significantly from 
the others. The other two were similar, but given that the 
last doubled the first in length, it may be said that the 
two largest cyclical investment drives in pre-1950 Latin 
America occurred in the 1880s and the 1920s. This is 
consistent with the fact that the contractions that ended 
these booms were the severest in the century between 
1856 and 1950, except for the downturn during the 
First World War. Obviously, the latter was exceptional 
inasmuch as its cause was wholly exogenous, unlike other 
investment crises. What is more, all the cycles —except 
those indicated— were characterized by a relatively high 
and stable rate of investment growth: between 6% and 
8% per year. This was, according to the data, the cruising 
speed at which Latin America managed to capitalize 
until the Second World War. The region departed from 
this investment pattern —with either positive or negative 
variations— only during a few periods of turbulence in 
extraordinary circumstances. Since the Second World 
War, the stationary rate of investment has been lower, 
from 4% to 5% per year. The most obvious deviation 
IV
fluctuations in gfcf: cycles and volatility
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from this cyclical pattern occurred towards the end 
of the “golden age” (1962-1980), during which Latin 
America exhibited the most sustained, though not the 
most intensive, investment effort in its history.
For reasons of space, it is outside the scope of this 
work to analyse the nature of the movements in the series 
in greater depth. Yet there is one highly idiosyncratic 
component of the macromagnitude examined which 
should not be overlooked: its great variability. The data 
in table 6 show clearly that investment has fluctuated 
strongly. The measure of volatility far exceeded the 
annual growth rate in all the cycles. The only two 
exceptions to this pattern occurred at the time of the 
largest boom, during the shield of State intervention 
(from 1952 to 1958 and from 1962 to 1980). But the 
prime focus of attention must be the fact that in the 
century prior to 1950, standard deviation was five 
times the rate of annual variation, which speaks of an 
extremely volatile variable. By contrast, since 1950 
the investment cycle has become much less extreme 
(standard deviation is only 50% more than the growth 
rate). The most severe cycle by far was during the First 
World War, when there was an extreme swing between 
the most violent contractionary and expansionary phases 
in the last century and a half. The cycles of 1884-1890, 
1890-1896 and 1929-1937 were also turbulent, with 
large expansions and reactivations before and after 
major slumps. Conversely, the expansionary cycle at the 
end of the belle époque (1907-1913) was characterized 
by a very stable rate of growth. No doubt the mythical 
aura surrounding this period has much to do with that 
regularity. Interestingly, the same cannot be said of the 
other period often thought to be the most prosperous 
before the “golden age”: the 1920s. 
V
Concluding remarks
Empirical studies on the theory of economic growth 
are limited by a lack of statistical data on the basic 
macromagnitudes of developing economies in the 
period before 1950. In the case of the Latin American 
countries, data on capital formation were particularly 
lacking. This work has to a great extent covered that 
deficit by providing a quantification of gfcf and its 
two main components —investment in equipment and 
in construction— for all the countries of the region, 
except Guatemala, Panama and Paraguay. The annual and 
continuous series provided span the period from 1856 to 
1950. Linking these series with those generated by the 
official national accounts systematized and standardized 
by eclac provides a reliable quantification of gfcf in 
the Latin American economies from 1856 to the present. 
Several important facts emerge from the examination 
of very long-term gfcf patterns. First, the greatest 
investment growth occurred in the second half of the 
nineteenth century, during the first wave of globalization; 
more specifically, between 1856 (possibly earlier) and 
1890. Second, it was over this period, not later, that 
equipment endowment grew faster than endowments 
of other capital goods, which means that the region’s 
economies boosted their long-term growth potential more 
in the nineteenth century than they did later, or at least 
during the first half of the twentieth century. Third, gfcf 
was highly volatile during the century leading up to 1950, 
becoming much less so thereafter. The explanation for the 
contrast probably lies in the key impact of primary goods 
exports and foreign capital on gfcf before the Second 
World War. Insofar as investment instability is bad for 
economic growth, the possibilities for Latin American 
economies have brightened since the Second World War. 
Fourth and last, the data show that the most laggard 
economies have tended to make a greater investment 
effort per capita than more advanced economies. This 
has produced only very partial convergence, however: 
the disparities in per capita investment levels, which were 
extreme in the mid-nineteenth century, have remained 
very sharp.
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